Finally, I assess Karl Barth's dialectical appropriation of the dual christological formula and explore briefly what implications this analysis has for contemporary christological understanding.
Before proceeding through these steps, the reader needs to keep in mind the distinction between the two positions: (1) that the human nature of Jesus does not subsist except in its union with the Logos in the one person of Christ, and (2) that enhypostasis and anhypostasis are good terms to describe this fact about the human nature of Jesus. Most of the players in this theological drama-certainly Leontius, most of the Protestant Scholastics, and Barth-do in fact affirm the first position. Although the formula under discussion has been wed to this doctrine for the last 400 years in much of Protestant theology, it is not necessary to assert the second position in order to affirm the first. Therefore, if one discovers that neither Leontius nor any other patristic writer taught the second view, this does not have to shake one's faith in the first. Rather, one simply needs to look for better ways of stating that view. At the very least, those who decide to continue using the formula should be aware of the pertinent grammatical problems and the philosophical issues that shaped the original formulation. The epistemic and methodological factors that led to the affirmation of the second position need to be appreciated so that any new constructive formulations will not repeat the errors of the past. The first step is to understand the context of the allegedly new definitions of the terms in question.
LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM
The fact that several persons with the name Leontius were producing theological treatises in the sixth century has often led to confusion. 5 For our purposes, it is important to note that most scholars link our Leontius, i.e., the author of Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, with the Leontius of Byzantium about whom Cyril of Skythopolis wrote in his Vita Sabae. This is relevant because the latter Leontius was a Palestinian monk who lead an "Origenist" party that caused considerable political trouble, apparently even taking up garden tools as weapons. Virtually all scholars now agree that we are dealing here with one and the same Leontius. This is enigmatic, for in what sense may our Leontius, whose Christology seems to support Chalcedonian orthodoxy, be labelled an Origenist?
The first person to go against the received wisdom of affirming Leontius's orthodoxy was David Evans in 1970. For Evans, the "Origenism" of our Leontius was indeed doctrinal. In order to make his case, 5 In Patrologia Graeca (PG) 86, Migne mistakenly attributed Adversus Nestorianos to Leontius of Byzantium; we now know that it was written by Leontius of Jerusalem, a contemporary. For a summary of the issues in Leontian scholarship, see Brian Daley, S.J., "The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium," Journal of Theological Studies 27 (1976) 333-69. however, Evans had to admit that Leontius never actually says anything christologically Origenistic, but that it is "hidden" behind the arguments. In fact, Evans posits that Leontius consciously went to considerable effort to hide it so as to avoid persecution. 11 This is the christological exigency that Leontius is addressing. A brief summary will suffice to give a sense of the argument. The book is comprised of a brief prologue, seven chapters, and an epilogue that introduces a long florilegium. Each of the seven chapters begins with a dubitatio or objection set forth by Leontius's adversaries to which he then responds.
THE TEACHING OF CONTRA NESTORIANOS ET EUTYCHIANOS
Chapter 1 stands by itself as the first step in the argument and it is here that Leontius uses the term enypostaton. He first asserts that both the Nestorians and the Monophysites represented metonymically by Eutyches share in a common fallacy. Both express the following objection: "If you posit two natures of the one Christ, but if there is no nature without hypostasis, then there will be [in him] two hypostases, too." The task is to understand how Leontius responded to this objection, and how one should respond.
However, the section in Chapter 1 that cites the term enypostaton cannot be understood fully apart from the general flow of his broader argument. The next five chapters are conceptually unified by Leontius's argument that the paradigmatic analogy for understanding the two natures of Christ is the union of soul and body, introduced in the last sentence of Chapter 1. His own view of this union of body and soul is rooted in an anthropology which first divides the soul into ousia logike and poiotes asomatos, and then divides the latter "immaterial quality into three faculties: appetitive, spirited and cognitive. These five chapters are Leontius' responses to further dubitationes: Chapters 2-4 are against the Nestorians (who reject this analogy), Chapters 5-6 are against the Monophysites (who misrepresent it to buttress their heretical teachings).
Chapter 7 stands alone as a summary and conclusion. Although Leontius formally maintains the style of dubitatio, in reality he has left it; here his enemies simply ask him to summarize the issues and his position. This he does by discussing the tropos tes henoseos. He attacks both the Nestorian kat y axian and the Monophysite misunderstanding of hat' ousian. Leontius summarizes his analysis of being which he has developed to make comprehensible the type of union he wants to predicate of the two natures of Christ. For Leontius, all beings are defined by simultaneous modes of union and distinction. So he says there are things united by species but distinguished by hypostases (class I) and things distinguished by species but united by hypostases (class II). As Evans puts it, these can be thought of respectively as beings in their mode of nature and in their mode of union.
13 Beings of class I may be further divided in two ways: they either possess their union and distinction as simple or as composite. Second, beings of class I are in a union kat' ousian, so that one may distinguish between those that do 12 1 am indebted to the analysis of Evans in the following summary. 13 Evans, Leontius of Byzantium especially 33 ff. Evans introduced the terms "class I" and "class IF for easy reference. not preserve the integrity of the definition of their being (in the union) and those that do. For Leontius, both the "Word" and the "flesh" are beings that fall into this latter subdivision in their union kaf ousian. Other examples of the union of such beings include fire and wood in one torch, and body and soul in one person.
Our main concern is how (or whether) Leontius meant the term enypostaton to serve as a solution to the dubitatio of the first chapter. Let us reconstruct it in the form of a syllogism. For Leontius's adversaries, the conjunction of A and B entails C.
A. Jesus Christ has two natures (duo physeis epi tou henos Christou) B. There is no nature without hypostasis (ouk esti physis anypostatos) C. Jesus Christ has two hypostases (duo ara an eien kai hai hypostaseis)
The Monophysites avoided C by rejecting premise A, and argued instead for one nature (at least "after the union," following Eutyches). The Nestorians boldly chose C, or at least put a division between hypostases. Leontius, on the other hand, rejected the validity of the syllogism by attacking the elliptical premise of his enemies that would be required for the entailment relation to hold, namely that two natures cannot be united in one hypostasis. This was the whole point of his extensive analysis of being, which he summarized in Chapter 7. The traditional reading of Leontius has been that the way he critiqued this elliptical premise was to give the term "enhypostasized" a new specific and nontraditional metaphysical meaning, which enabled him to avoid the heresy of C. This modern interpretation is now commonly attributed most to the influence of Friedrich Loofs. Finally, Loofs misunderstands the word enypostaton itself. As Daley notes in a recent essay, "One of Loofs' most influential mistakes was to take the word enhypostaton ... not to mean 'hypostatic/ liaving a concrete existence,' as in fact it does, but to mean liypostasized' or 'existent within 9 something else: to take the en-in the term, in other words, as a localizing prefix rather than simply the opposite of an alpha privative." 17 If enypostaton means just "subsisting" and does not carry the metaphysical implications proposed by Loofs, then Leontius can be seen as a creative systematizer of Chalcedon, rather than a radical innovator or neologist.
Aloys Grillmeier reached a similar conclusion: "Chalcedon speaks of one hypostasis only. It seems that contrary to an 'opinio communis which went well beyond the one given here." 18 And more recently Grillmeier further argued ". .. that which is enhypostaton has being and actuality in itself. Thereby it is also shown that the prefix en in the compound word enhypostaton has been falsely interpreted. It is the opposite of an alpha priuativum (e.g. a-hypostaton) and means precisely the possession of that property which was denied by the negation. Enhypostaton thus means nothing other than 'to have a concrete existence,' 'to have actuality." n But one draws a false conclusion if one infers that a thing is a hypostasis from the assertion that it is not without subsistence [me anypostaton]. Similarly, one can rightly say: "there is no such thing as a body without form [soma aschematistori]." But it would be incorrectto conclude that the form is a body; rather, it is only perceived in the body. Certainly, there is no non-subsistent nature, i.e., essence. A nature, however, is not a hypostasis, for there cannot be a reversal here. A hypostasis is also a nature, but a nature is not also a hypostasis. A nature [physis] admits of the predication of "being" [einai], but a hypostasis may be further defined as that which "is by itself [katf eauton einai]. The former indicates the character of a universal; the latter identifies a particular within a species. "Nature" designates the peculiarity of that which is held in common; hypostasis marks off a misreading of the terms. Since the Damascene explicitly refers to Leontius of Byzantium, however, it makes sense to focus our analysis on him. sisting" and, given Aristotelian assumptions, a nature cannot subsist ante rem but only in rebus.
Why would Loofs make such a terminological mistake, and why was it so readily accepted and dyed into the wool of christological interpretation in modern times? The first clue is Loofs's use of the German noun form "Enhypostasie" (the English form is enhypostasis; both translate enhypostasia) to refer to the human nature of Christ. But the word enhypostasia is not found in Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos. Indeed, one may search the entire corpus Leontianum for it to no avail. Leontius consistently uses the adjectival form enypostatos and it means simply "hypostatic." Similarly, there is no such word as anhypostasia in Leontius, only the adjective anypostatos which always means "without hypostasis" or "not hypostatic." For a nature to be enypostaton means for it to have concrete existence; for a nature to be anypostaton makes no sense. The latter cannot be predicated of the former since both Leontius and his adversaries held to the Aristotelian view of metaphysics.
The noun form enhypostasia is found nowhere in any of the early Fathers, because it simply is not a word in their vocabulary. A search of the Thesaurus linguae graecae database shows no instances in the Greek Fathers of enypostasia or enhypostasis and only one case of anypostasia. The latter is found in an obscure author within a sevenword fragment which is not even a sentence, but merely a list of words. Why then did Loofs use the noun form to describe Leontius's theory? Had theologians in the history of the Church ever utilized this term prior to Loofs? One does find it alongside anhypostasia in the writings of some Protestant Scholastics during the late 16th and 17th centuries.
ANHYPOSTASIA AND ENHYPOSTASIA EST PROTESTANT SCHOLASTICISM
If the seeds of the enhypostasis theory reading of Leontius were planted during the formative period of Protestant theology and grew alongside other doctrinal developments, then eradicating the terminology of the dual formula as referring to the human nature of Jesus may be more difficult for the Lutheran and Reformed traditions than for Catholic theology. 28 The situation is even more complicated for scholarship on Barth if the formula is taken to be the material and methodological centerpiece of his whole theology.
When Barth adopted these terms, he clearly thought they repre- 42 One might expect a parable that aims to replace the "time-eternity" dialectic to reach beyond the predicates of the human nature of Jesus. To find such a parable, one might explore, for example, the broader arena of God's revelation "in Christ," which includes for Barth not only Word but also Spirit, not only the objective but also the subjective reality of God's self-revelation. Here too one can find at least the seeds of other parables in Parts 5-7 of the Gottingen Dogmatics.
Despite the fact that Barth refers to the formula only three or four times in 1/2 and IV/2, it was clearly important for him. This twofold doctrine, which he incorrectly thought was "unanimously sponsored by early theology in its entirety," 43 is not a superfluous theologoumenon: "this concept [anhypostasis-enhypostasis] is quite unavoidable at this point if we are properly to describe the mystery."
44 My preceding analysis of the formula suggests that those who desire to join Barth in affirming the importance of the concept should make an explicit and careful distinction between the concept and the contingency of the dyad which has come to express it. In any case, by arguing that the dual formula is not necessarily the central parable, and that these terms are not necessary for expressing Barth's view of the Realdialektik, one may reject the Protestant Scholastic terminology and its problems without simultaneously rejecting Barth's contributions to the doctrine of revelation.
The later Barth referred to the Church as anhypostasis and enhypostasis in relation to Christ, 45 and without using the terms he applied a similar structural apparatus to the experience of awakening to conversion in the individual Christian as well. 46 The individual is not a new man outside the regenerative activity of the divine Spirit, but is a new man through that activity. What seems most important to Barth is not the terms, but a specific kind of relational unity that maintains the asymmetry of the divine initiative. This suggests that for Barth the critical issue is not the anhypostasis-enhypostasis formula, but an insistence on the creature's total reliance on God's grace.
CONCLUSION
I conclude by stressing again the importance of distinguishing the following statements: (1) that the human nature of Jesus does not subsist except in its union with the Logos in the one Person of Christ, and (2) that enhypostasis and anhypostasis are good terms to describe this fact about the human nature of Jesus. If one is compelled to reject the second thesis, and the use of the formula in the way meant by the Protestant Scholastics, Loofs, and Barth, this does not mean that one rejects what they were trying to express by using those terms, namely, the first thesis. Instead, one needs to search for better ways to state the mystery of the relation between the Logos and the flesh in Jesus Christ. What is at issue is the clarity of one's confession that the Lord is fully divine and fully human in one Person.
A final implication that may be drawn from this analysis is the importance of recognizing how powerfully theological anthropology shapes Christology. For Leontius, the paradigmatic analogy for the relational unity of the Word and the flesh in Jesus Christ was the relational unity of soul and body in a human person. For the Lutheran Scholastics, it appears that the nominalist avoidance of speaking of a universal human nature led them to misinterpret the terms enypostaton and anypostaton. Barth's tendency, in his polemic against analogia entis, to eschew speculative anthropology of any kind, led to such a strong emphasis in his theological method on the transcendent that he was accused of revelational positivism. While it would be reductionistic to suggest a causal determinism in the relation of anthropology and Christology, one cannot deny that there is a reciprocal influence between them. The importance of the nature and quality of relationality in both doctrines should also lead theologians to make explicit their underlying presuppositions about epistemic and ontic relational structures in all anthropological and christological reflection.
